조동봉 용산공업고등학교건축과 反宇宙體반우주체식인체食人體식육체食肉體마물체魔物體짐승체獸禽畜體부정정사否定情事부정사음부정정교부정섹스부정결혼부정혼인부정통혼플레이아데스4대무법자630128-1067814朴鐘權的大億劫的削的磨的滅的處理的반사회성인격장애否定腐敗부정부패荷蘭네덜란드尼德蘭아틀란티스Atlantis준아틀란티스준성단준성운지구말데크Maldek리라Lyra베가VegaαLyrae안드로메다아플레이아데스α LyraeAlpha LyraeAlpha Lyr or α Lyr 리라Lyra플레이아데스4대무법자 아플레이아데스1대수장首長 아플레이아데스2대수장首長 이건희(李健熙, 1942년 1월 9일~2020년 10월 25일) 이재용(李在鎔, 1968년 6월 23일~) 이병철(李秉喆, 1910년 2월 12일 ~ 1987년 11월 19일) 메이지 천황(일본어: 明治天皇 메이지 텐노[*], 1852년 11월 3일 ~ 1912년 7월 30일) 쇼와 천황(일본어: 昭和天皇, 1901년 4월 29일 ~ 1989년 1월 7일) 조지 워커 부시(영어: George Walker Bush 듣기 (도움말·정보), 문화어: 죠지 워커 부쉬, 1946년 7월 6일~) 엘리자베스 2세(영어: Elizabeth II, 1926년 4월 21일~2022년 9월 8일) 엘리자베스 1세(영어: Elizabeth I, 1533년 9월 7일 ~ 1603년 3월 24일) 마거릿 힐더 대처(영어: Margaret Hilda Thatcher, Baroness Thatcher, LG, OM, 1925년 10월 13일 ~ 2013년 4월 8일) 연 태조 문명황제 모용황(燕 太祖 文明皇帝 慕容皝, 297년 ~ 348년, 재위: 337년 ~ 348년) 아틸라(라틴어: Attila, 고대 노르드어: Atli 아틀리→끔찍한 자, 독일어: Etzel 에첼[*], 406년 ~ 453년) 리라Lyra플레이아데스4대무법자미마쓰 리라Lyra플레이아데스4대무법자프타(Ptah, Ptaha, Peteh, Tathenen, Tanen) 리라Lyra플레이아데스4대무법자아루쓰 리라Lyra플레이아데스4대무법자오자와 제2차은하대전위원장냉기치 연산군(燕山君, 1476년 12월 2일 (음력 11월 7일) ~ 1506년 11월 30일 (음력 11월 6일)) 성종(成宗, 1457년 ~ 1494년, 재위 : 1469년 ~ 1494년) 예종(1450~1469, 재위 1468~1469) 고종(高宗, 1852년 7월 25일 ~ 1919년 1월 21일) 당 고종 이치(唐 高宗 李治, 628년 7월 21일(음력 6월 15일) ~ 683년 12월 27일(음력 12월 4일)) 당 현종 이융기(唐玄宗 李隆基, 685년 9월 8일(음력 8월 5일) ~ 762년 5월 3일(음력 4월 5일)) 당 태종 이세민(唐 太宗 李世民, 598년 1월 23일(음력 597년 12월 22일) ~ 649년 7월 10일(음력 5월 26일)) 김일성(金日成, 1912년 4월 15일 ~ 1994년 7월 8일) 박헌영(朴憲永, 1900년 5월 28일 ~ 1955년 12월 5일) 고시원(考試院) 숙소 숙박(宿泊, 영어: lodging) 거소 민가(民家) 거주지(居住地) 주택지(住宅地) 주거 지역(住居地域) 또는 주택가(住宅街) 주거지 주민등록지 출생등록지 주민등록번호 대한민국 주민등록법 대한민국大韓民國 대한민국 영토 대한민국 국민 구글 뉴스와 구글 블로그 티스토리 블로그 다음커뮤니케이션 Daum blog 또는 weblog 박정희(朴正熙,[4] 1917년 11월 14일~1979년 10월 26일) 이승만(李承晚[3], 1875년 3월 26일 ~ 1965년 7월 19일) 장면(張勉, 1899년 8월 28일 ~ 1966년 6월 4일) 윤보선(尹潽善[2], 1897년 8월 26일~1990년 7월 18일) 전두환(한국 한자: 全斗煥, 1931년 1월 18일~2021년 11월 23일) 노태우(盧泰愚, 1932년 12월 4일~2021년 10월 26일[2][3]) 김대중(金大中[3], 1924년 1월 6일~2009년 8월 18일) 김영삼(金泳三, 1929년 1월 14일[3]~2015년 11월 22일) 노무현(盧武鉉[4], 1946년 9월 1일~2009년 5월 23일) 이명박(李明博[1], 1941년 12월 19일~) 박근혜(朴槿惠[2], 1952년 2월 2일~) 문재인(文在寅, 1953년 1월 24일~) 윤석열(尹錫悅, 표준 발음: 윤서결[주해 1], 1960년 12월 18일~) 카탈라우눔 전투 또는 샬롱 전투는 451년 플라비우스 아이티우스와 서고트족 왕 테오도리쿠스 1세가 이끄는 서로마 제국과 포이데라티의 연합군과 아틸라가 이끄는 훈족과 그 동맹군 사이의 전투이다.이 전투는 서로마 제국 최후의 주요 군사작전이 되었으며 이 전투에서 서고트족 국왕 테오도리쿠스 1세가 전사하고 어느 쪽도 결정적인 승리를 거두지는 못했으나, 훈족의 서진을 저지하는 데 성공하였다. 역사의 기록은 분명히 과장되었고 따라서 믿을 수 없기 때문에, 양 측의 병력 규모는 추측으로만 알 수 있다. 6세기의 로마 역사가 요르다네스(Jordanes)는 당시 전장에 50만 명의 병사가 있다고도 했다. 군 역사가들의 견해에 따르면, 당시의 병참 기술을 고려했을 때 아무리 많더라도 양 쪽에 약 5만에서 6만 정도의 군인들이 있었을 거라고 한다. 하지만 아마 더욱 더 적었을 것이다. 로마 군대의 경우에는 그 수를 더 잘 추정할 수 있다. 요르다네스에 따르면 그 군대의 절반가량은 포이데라티(foederati, 로마 제국 내의 영주권을 인정받는 대가로 병력 제공의 의무를 진 이민족들)라고 불린 서고트족들인데, 그들은 전성기에도 전장에 2만 명 이상 나갈 수 없었기 때문이다. 그러므로 알라니(Alani)족을 고려한다고 해도 서로마 황제 휘하 군대는 결코 45000명을 훨씬 넘지 않았을 것이다. 아틸라의 군대는 크지는 않은 수적 우세를 가졌다. 그러므로 약 최대 5만 명의 병력이 있었을 것이다. 다른 추측에 따르면 양 편의 군대는 약 3만 명 정도라고 한다. 이것이 5세기와 6세기 시절 고대 후기 군대의 보통 규모와 일치할 것이기 때문이다. 아틸라의 군대는 절반 정도만 훈족으로 구성되어 있었고 나머지 절반은 속국 병사들로 채워졌다. 이 병력들을 크기 순서대로 나열하면, 발라미르가 이끄는 동고트족, 아르다리쿠스가 이끄는 게피다이(Gepidae)족과, 라인강 우변에 사는 프랑크족 및 마인 강가에 사는 부족의 일족인 부르고뉴(부르군트)족이 특히 중요하다. 또한 헤룰리(Heruli)족, 스키리(Scirii)족, 랑고바르디(Langobardi)족 등이 소규모 병력으로 수백 명부터 2천 명까지 있었다. 동고트족이 속국 병력의 약 절반을 차지했던 것은 확인되었다. 훈족 병사들은 평소대로 말을 탄 채 창, 곤봉, 고리형 끈과 가장 중요한 무기인 특수 제작된 기병용 활로 무장했다. 그들은 보통은 어떤 갑옷도 착용하지 않았고 단지 작은 원형 가죽방패만 방어용으로 사용하였다. 게르만족 쪽의 속국 병력의 경우에는 달랐다. 동고트족의 병력 중 1/3은 기병이었는데, 다른 족들은 모두가 보병이었다. 동고트족 기병은 중무장 기병으로 분류될 수 있다. 당시에 그들은 찌르기용 창과 날이 넓은 검(독어 Breitschwert / 영어 broadsword)을 사용했으며, 최소한 가죽 갑옷을 착용하였지만 때로 쇠사슬 갑옷을 착용하기도 했으며, 방패를 구비하기도 하였기 때문이다. 그러나 이 시기의 고대 후기에는 아직 등자(말을 탈 때 발을 받쳐주는 도구)가 없었다. 보병들은 프랑크족을 제외하면 추측컨대 대개 갑옷없이 창, 날이 넓은 검 또는 장검을 가지고, 일부는 가벼운 방패도 가지고 출전했을 것이다. 게르만족은 원거리 무기를 거의 사용하지 않았으나, 동고트족만은 궁수 부대가 있었다. 프랑크족은 ‘프란치스카(Franzisca)’라는 일회용 원거리 무기, 즉 휘어진 모양의 투척용 도끼를 병사들의 충돌 직전에 사용했다. 그와 상관없이 프랑크족 병사들은 날이 넓은 검과 나무방패로 무장했다. 아에티우스의 군대는 절반가량이 로마 정규군 부대 및 프랑크족과 부르고뉴족의 포이데라티로 이루어졌고, 나머지 절반은 서고트족의 병사들로 이루어졌다. 여기에 수천 명의 알라니족이 함께했다. 로마군, 프랑크군, 부르고뉴군은 중무장 보병대를 형성했다. 그 때에는 로마 후기의 병사들은 더 이상 로마 제정 초기 시절의 군단(legio)이 아니었다. 그들은 타원형 방패, 조임쇠가 달린 투구, 양날의 긴 검(spatha), 당시 로마군에게 항상 상당한 전투력을 안겨준 동양식 복합형 활을 가지고 다녔으며, 팔다리를 더 이상 가리지 않는 쇠사슬갑옷을 입었다. 그 부대의 일부는 아직 ‘군단’이라 불렸으나 1천 명에서 2천 명 사이의 병력만을 통솔했다. 아에티우스가 소집했던 많은 군인들은 리미타네이(limitanei, 국경지역 병사들)로 여겨지는데, 이들은 대체로 주둔지 근처의 특정 지역에 거주하는 주민들로 구성되었다. 이것은 기동성을 줄이지만 바로 그들 자신의 공동체와 가족을 지키려는 까닭에, 이 부대의 사기는 그만큼 높다. 황제 근위대인 코미타텐세스(comitatenses)는 5세기 중엽 서로마에서 더 이상 큰 역할을 하지 못했는데, 이 정예군 아래 끝없는 안팎의 분쟁이 높은 손실을 끼쳤고, 텅 빈 국고 때문에 이 부대를 예전과 같이 만들 수 없었기 때문이다. 아에티우스는 코미타텐세스도 포함하여 아직 지휘권이 있는 로마 군대 모두를 아틸라에게 대항하도록 했던 것으로 보인다. 많은 이들이 기병이었다. 라인강 변에 사는 리푸아리아 프랑크족은 아마 위에 언급된 라인강 오른쪽에 사는 프랑크족과 똑같이 무장하였을 것이다. 양 측 군대에 다 있는 부르고뉴족은 단지 장검만으로 싸웠음이 명백하다. 서고트족 병사들은 378년의 아드리아노폴리스 전투 이래로, 알라니족 기병대의 명백한 본보기를 통해 보병에서 점점 더 많이 기병으로 넘어가고 있었다. 그래서 적어도 서고트 징집병의 2/3는 기병이었다. 그들은 쇠사슬갑옷과 찌르기용 창으로 무장한 귀족 기병대와, 일반 민중 출신의 경무장 기병대로 나뉜다. 후자의 기병대는 대개 갑옷이 없었으나, 투창, 날이 넓은 검, 그리고 아마도 나무나 여러 겹의 가죽으로 된 작은 기병용 방패는 있었다. 보병들에게는 창, 날이 넓은 검, 방패가 아주 널리 퍼졌으며 극히 드물지만 단순형 활도 있었고, 갑옷은 없었다. 알라니족의 무장과 싸우는 방식은 결과적으로 훈족을 아주 많이 닮았다.The Battle of the Catalaunian Plains (or Fields), also called the Battle of the Campus Mauriacus, Battle of Châlons, Battle of Troyes[5] or the Battle of Maurica, took place on June 20, 451 AD, between a coalition, led by the Roman general Flavius Aetius and the Visigothic king Theodoric I, against the Huns and their vassals, commanded by their king, Attila. It proved one of the last major military operations of the Western Roman Empire, although Germanic foederati composed the majority of the coalition army. Whether the battle was of strategic significance is disputed; historians generally agree that the siege of Aurelianum was the decisive moment in the campaign[citation needed] and stopped the Huns' attempt to advance any further into Roman territory or establish vassals in Roman Gaul. However, the Huns successfully looted and pillaged much of Gaul and crippled the military capacity of the Romans and Visigoths. Attila died only two years later, in 453; after the Battle of Nedao in 454 AD, the coalition of the Huns and the incorporated Germanic vassals gradually disintegrated. By 450 AD, the Romans had restored their authority in much of the province of Gaul, although control over all of the provinces beyond Italy was continuing to diminish. Armorica was only nominally part of the empire, and Germanic tribes occupying Roman territory had been forcibly settled and bound by treaty as Foederati under their own leaders. Northern Gaul between the Rhine north of Xanten and the Lys (Germania Inferior) had unofficially been abandoned to the Salian Franks. The Visigoths on the Garonne were growing restive, but still holding to their treaty. The Burgundians in Sapaudia were more submissive, but likewise awaiting an opening for revolt.[6] The Alans on the Loire and in Valentinois were more loyal, having served the Romans since the defeat of Jovinus in 411 and the Siege of Bazas in 414.[7] The parts of Gaul still securely in Roman control were the Mediterranean coastline; a region including Aurelianum (present-day Orléans) along the Seine and the Loire as far north as Soissons and Arras; the middle and upper Rhine to Cologne; and downstream along the Rhône.[8] The historian Jordanes states that Attila was enticed by the Vandal king Genseric to wage war on the Visigoths. At the same time, Genseric would attempt to sow strife between the Visigoths and the Western Roman Empire.[9][Note 1] However, Jordanes' account of Gothic history is notoriously unreliable.[10][Note 2] Modern scholars now believe that this explanation was Jordanes projecting contemporary events and political opinions onto Attila's time, and it was likely not original to Priscus. Christiensen points out that Amalafrida, wife of Thrasamund, was imprisoned and murdered by Hilderic after Thrasamund's death in 523, and that the tale of the blinding of Theodoric's daughter by Huneric was a fabrication.[14] Other contemporary writers offer different motivations: Justa Grata Honoria, the sister of the emperor Valentinian III, had been betrothed to the former consul Bassus Herculanus the year before. In 450, she sent the eunuch Hyacinthus to the Hunnic king asking for Attila's help in escaping her confinement, with her ring as proof of the letter's legitimacy.[15] Allegedly, Attila interpreted it as offering her hand in marriage, and he had claimed half of the empire as a dowry. He demanded Honoria to be delivered along with the dowry. Valentinian rejected these demands, and Attila used it as an excuse to launch a destructive campaign through Gaul.[Note 3] Hughes suggests that the reality of this interpretation should be that Honoria was using Attila's status as honorary magister militum for political leverage.[16] Another conflict leading into the war was that in 449, the King of the Franks (possibly Chlodio) had died and that his two sons argued over the succession: while the older son sought Attila's help, the younger sided with Aetius, who adopted him. The identity of the younger prince, who was seen at Rome by the historian Priscus,[17] remains unclear, though both Merowech and Childeric I have been suggested. Attila crossed the Rhine early in 451 with his followers and a large number of allies, sacking Divodurum (now Metz) on April 7.[18] Schultheis notes, however, that sacking of Metz on April 7 may have been a literary trope used by Hydatius and Gregory of Tours to emphasize Attila's pagan nature to a Christian audience and may not be reliable.[19] Other cities attacked can be determined by the hagiographies written to commemorate their bishops: Nicasius was slaughtered before the altar of his church in Reims; Servatius is alleged to have saved Tongeren with his prayers, as Genevieve is to have saved Lutetia. Lupus, bishop of Troyes, is also credited with saving his city by meeting Attila in person.[Note 4] Many other cities also claim to have been attacked in these accounts, although archaeological evidence shows no destruction layer dating to the timeframe of the invasion. The most likely explanation for Attila's widespread devastation of Gaul is that Attila's main column followed the Roman roads and crossed the Rhine at Argentoratum (Strasbourg) before marching to Borbetomagus (Worms), Mogontiacum (Mainz), Augusta Treverorum (Trier), Divodurum (Metz), Durocotorum (Reims), and finally Aurelianum (Orléans), while sending a small detachment north into Frankish territory to plunder the countryside. This explanation would support the literary evidence claiming North Gaul was attacked, and the archaeological evidence showing major population centers were not sacked.[19][20] Attila's army had reached Aurelianum (modern Orléans, France) before June. According to Jordanes, the Alan king Sangiban, whose Foederati realm included Aurelianum, had promised to open the city gates.[21] This siege is confirmed by the account of the Vita S. Aniani and in the later account of Gregory of Tours, although Sangiban's name does not appear in their accounts.[22][23] However, the inhabitants of Aurelianum shut their gates against the advancing invaders, and Attila began to besiege the city, while he waited for Sangiban to deliver on his promise. There are two different accounts of the Siege of Aurelianum, and Hughes suggests that combining them provides a better understanding of what actually happened.[24] After four days of heavy rain, Attila began his final assault on June 14, which was broken off due to the approach of the Roman coalition.[22] Modern scholars tend to agree that the Siege of Aurelianum was the high point of Attila's attack on the West, and the staunch Alan defence of the city was the real decisive factor in the war of 451.[24] Contrary to Jordanes, the Alans were never planning to defect as they were the loyal backbone of the Roman defence in Gaul.[25][26] Forces Both armies consisted of combatants from many peoples. Besides the Roman troops, the Alans, and the Visigoths, Jordanes lists Aetius' allies as including the Francii, Sarmatae, Armoriciani, Liticiani, Burgundiones, Saxones, Riparii, and Olibrones (whom he describes as "once Roman soldiers and now the flower of the allied forces"), as well as "other Celtic or German tribes."[27] The Liticiani could be either Laeti or Romano-Britons, the latter of which are recorded by Gregory.[28][29][30] Halsall argues that the Rhine limitanei and the old British field army composed the forces of the Riparii and Armoricans, and Heather suggests that the Visigoths may have been able to field about 25,000 men total.[31] Drinkwater adds that a faction of Alemanni may have participated in the battle, possibly on both sides like the Franks and Burgundians.[32] The Olibrones remain unknown, although it has been suggested these were Germanic limitanei garrisons.[33] Schultheis argues that on paper, the Germanic federates could theoretically number more than 70,000, but likely numbered under 50,000.[34] A sense of the size of the actual Roman army may be found in the study of the Notitia Dignitatum by A.H.M. Jones.[35] This document is a list of officials and military units that was last updated in the first decades of the fifth century. The Notitia Dignitatum lists 58 various regular units, and 33 limitanei serving either in the Gallic provinces or on the frontiers nearby; the total of these units, based on Jones' analysis, is 34,000 for the regular units and 11,500 for the limitanei, or just under 46,000 all told. However, this figure is an estimate for the years 395–425 and one that constantly changes with new research. The loss of the Western Roman provinces in North Africa resulted in the loss of funding for 40,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry in the Roman army, in addition to previous losses, which was enough to permanently cripple Roman military capacity after 439 AD.[36] According to Herwig Wolfram, with an annual revenue of 40,000 pounds of gold in 450 AD, the Western Empire would have had to spend almost two thirds of its income to maintain an army of 30,000 men.[37] Hugh Elton gives the same figure in 450, but estimates the cost of maintaining an army of 300,000 at 31,625 lbs. of gold or 7.6 solidi a year per soldier. He states that there were also other unquantifiable military costs such as defensive installations, equipment, logistical supplies, paper, animals, and other costs. The size of the army in 450 AD therefore must have been significantly reduced from its status in the late 420's.[38] Schultheis argues that the Roman field army as calculated from his own estimates of the Notitia Dignitatum, chronology of military losses, and income losses numbered approximately 20,500 comitatenses and 18,000 limitanei by the time of the battle, not including supernumerary officers.[39] Jordanes' list for Attila's allies includes the Gepids under their king Ardaric, as well as an army of various Gothic groups led by the brothers Valamir, Theodemir (the father of the later Ostrogothic king Theodoric the Great) and Videmir, scions of the Amali Goths.[40] Sidonius Apollinaris offers a more extensive list of allies: Rugians, Gepids, Geloni, Burgundians, Sciri, Bellonoti, Neuri, Bastarnae, Thuringians, Bructeri, and Franks living along the River Neckar.[41] E.A. Thompson expresses his suspicions that some of these names are drawn from literary traditions rather than from the event itself: The Bastarnae, Bructeri, Geloni and Neuri had disappeared hundreds of years before the time of the Huns, while the Bellonoti had never existed at all: presumably the learned poet was thinking of the Balloniti, a people invented by Valerius Flaccus nearly four centuries earlier. On the other hand, Thompson believes that the presence of Burgundians on the Hunnic side is credible, noting that a group is documented remaining east of the Rhine; likewise, he believes that the other peoples Sidonius mentions (the Rugians, Sciri, and Thuringians) were participants in this battle.[42] Thompson remarks in a footnote, "I doubt that Attila could have fed an army of even 30,000 men."[43] Lindner argues that by crossing the Carpathians to the area of modern Hungary the Huns had forfeited their best logistic base and grazing grounds, and that the Great Hungarian Plain could only support 15,000 mounted nomads.[44] Schultheis notes that Attila had control of other Hunnic groups east of the Carpathians, and proposes the eastern half of Attila's empire could field an additional 7,000 to 12,000 men based on later 6th century sources.[45] Kim notes that the Huns continued use of the Xiongnu decimal system, meaning their army was probably organized into divisions of 10, 100, 1000, and 10,000, but no real estimates of Hunnic military capacity can be determined.[46] Their barbarian allies, however, do receive mentions at other times in other sources: in 430 CE. The Hunnish king Octar was defeated by a force of 3,000 Neckar Burgundians who would later come under Hun subjugation, and Heather estimates that both the Gepids and the Amali Goths could have each fielded a maximum of 15,000 men at the Battle of Nedao in 454.[47][48] Schultheis argues that when combining primary and secondary source estimates Attila's forces would number more than 100,000 on paper, but was likely closer to 70,000.[45] The Chronicon Paschale, which preserves an extremely abbreviated and garbled fragment of Priscus' account of the campaign, states that Attila's forces numbered in the tens of thousands.[49][50] Assuming that the Hunnic and Germanic forces were roughly the same size as the Roman and federate army, those involved in the battle could have been well in excess of 100,000 combatants in total. This excludes the inevitable servants and camp followers who usually escape mention in the primary sources. Site of the Catalaunian Fields Further information: Treasure of Pouan The actual location of the Catalaunian Fields has long been considered unclear. As a whole, the current scholarly consensus is that there is no conclusive site, merely being that it is in the vicinity of Châlons-en-Champagne (formerly called Châlons-sur-Marne) or Troyes. Historian Thomas Hodgkin located the site near Méry-sur-Seine.[51] A more recent evaluation of the location has been performed by Phillippe Richardot, who proposed a location of La Cheppe, slightly north of the modern town of Châlons.[52] In 1842, at Pouan-les-Vallées, a village on the south bank of the river Aube, a labourer uncovered a burial containing a skeleton, a number of jewels and gold ornaments, and two swords.[53] By the nature of its grave goods, it was initially thought to be the burial of Theodoric, but Hodgkin expressed skepticism, suggesting that this elite burial was that of a princely Germanic warrior who had lived in the fifth century.[54][55] The Treasure of Pouan is conserved in the Musée des beaux-arts de Troyes, Troyes. It is still not known whether or not the find is related to the battle. Simon Macdowall in his 2015 Osprey title proposed the battle took place at Montgueux just west of Troyes.[56] Macdowall goes as far as to identify the Roman alliance's camp site being placed at Fontvannes, a few kilometers west of the proposed battlefield, and places Attila's camp on the Seine at Saint-Lyé.[57] This draws on the earlier work of M. Girard, who was able to identify Maurica as the "les Maures" ridge of Montgueux, based on the second Additamenta Altera to Prosper's Epitoma Chronicon, which states it took place five Roman miles from Tecis or Tricasses, the modern Troyes. The road in the region is known as the "Voie des Maures", and the base of the ridge is known as "l'enfer" to the locals. A small stream near the battlefield that runs to Troyes is known as "la Riviere de Corps" to this day.[58] According to MacDowall, modern maps continue to identify the plains in the region as the "les Maurattes." Iaroslav Lebedensky argued the battle likely stretched across the plain from Montgueux south to Tourvellieres, while Schultheis argues that the battle took place wholly on the "les Maures" ridge itself until its final phase, when retreating and pursuing forces stretched across several kilometers.[59][60] The ridge at Montgueux is currently the most thoroughly researched proposal for the battlefield location. Battle Course of the battle The Battle of the Catalaunian Plains as depicted in the Chronica Hungarorum Upon learning of the invasion, the magister utriusque militiae Flavius Aetius moved his army rapidly from Italy to Gaul. According to Sidonius Apollinaris, he was leading a force consisting of "few and sparse auxiliaries without one regular soldier."[61] The insignificant number of Roman troops reported is probably due to the fact the majority of Aetius' army was stationed in Gaul, combined with Sidonius' need to embellish the account in favor of Avitus.[62] Aetius immediately attempted to persuade Theodoric I, king of the Visigoths, to join him. Allegedly, Theodoric learned how few troops Aetius had with him and decided it was wiser to wait and oppose the Huns in his own lands, so Aetius then turned to the former Praetorian Prefect of Gaul, Avitus, for help. According to tradition, Avitus was not only able to persuade Theodoric to join the Romans, but also a number of other wavering barbarian residents in Gaul.[63] The coalition assembled at Arelate (Arles) before moving to meet the Goths at Tolosa (Toulouse), and the army was supplied by Tonantius Ferreolus, who had been preparing for a Hunnic attack for a few years.[64] The combined army then marched to Aurelianum (present-day Orléans), reaching that city on June 14. From Aurelianum, Aetius and his coalition pursued Attila, who was leaving Gaul with the majority of his objectives completed.[65] According to Jordanes, the night before the main battle, some of the Franks allied with the Romans encountered a band of the Gepids loyal to Attila and engaged them in a skirmish. Jordanes' recorded number of 15,000 dead on either side for this skirmish is not verifiable.[66] Attila had set up a tactical delay along his route of retreat in order to keep Aetius from catching him before he arrived at a suitable battlefield location.[67] The two forces at last met somewhere on the Catalaunian Fields circa June 20, a date first proposed by J. B. Bury and since accepted by many, although some authors have proposed the first week of July or September 27.[68][51][69] The date of the battle can be secured to June by the entries of Hydatius' chronicle, which places it in-between the appearance and disappearance of Halley's Comet. According to tradition, Attila had his diviners examine the entrails of a sacrifice the morning of the day of the battle. They foretold that disaster would befall the Huns, but one of the enemy leaders would be killed. Attila delayed until the ninth hour (about 2:30 pm) so the impending sunset would help his troops to flee the battlefield in case of defeat.[70][71] Hughes takes his own interpretation of this, noting that the divination may be an indicator of Attila's barbarity and therefore possibly a fabrication. He states that the choice to begin the battle at the ninth hour was due to the fact that both sides spent the entire day carefully deploying their coalition armies.[72] According to Jordanes, the Catalaunian plain rose on one side by a sharp slope to a ridge; this geographical feature dominated the battlefield and became the center of the battle. The Huns first seized the right side of the ridge, while the Romans seized the left, with the crest unoccupied between them. Jordanes explains that the Visigoths held the right side, the Romans the left, with Sangiban of uncertain loyalty and his Alans surrounded in the middle. The Hunnic forces attempted to take the ridge, but were outstripped by the Romans under Aetius and the Goths under Thorismund.[73] Jordanes goes on to state that Theodoric, whilst leading his own men against the enemy Amali Goths, was killed in the assault without his men noticing. He then states that Theodoric was either thrown from his horse and trampled to death by his advancing men, or slain by the spear of the Amali Andag. Since Jordanes served as the notary of Andag's son Gunthigis, even if this latter story is not true, this version was certainly a proud family tradition.[74][49] Then Jordanes claims the Visigoths outstripped the speed of the Alans beside them and fell upon Attila's own Hunnic household unit. Attila was forced to seek refuge in his own camp, which he had fortified with wagons. The Romano-Gothic charge apparently swept past the Hunnic camp in pursuit; when night fell, Thorismund, son of king Theodoric, returning to friendly lines, mistakenly entered Attila's encampment. There he was wounded in the ensuing melee before his followers could rescue him. Darkness also separated Aetius from his own men. As he feared that disaster had befallen them, he spent the rest of the night with his Gothic allies.[75] On the following day, finding the battlefield was "piled high with bodies and the Huns did not venture forth", the Goths and Romans met to decide their next move. Knowing that Attila was low on provisions and "was hindered from approaching by a shower of arrows placed within the confines of the Roman camp", they started to besiege his camp. In this desperate situation, Attila remained unbowed and "heaped up a funeral pyre of horse saddles, so that if the enemy should attack him, he was determined to cast himself into the flames, that none might have the joy of wounding him and that the lord of so many races might not fall into the hands of his foes".[76] While Attila was besieged in his camp, the Visigoths searched for their missing king and his son Thorismund. After a long search, they found Theodoric's corpse "where the dead lay thickest" and bore him away with heroic songs in sight of the enemy. Upon learning of his father's death, Thorismund wanted to assault Attila's camp, but Aetius dissuaded him. According to Jordanes, Aetius feared that if the Huns were completely destroyed, the Visigoths would break off their allegiance to the Roman Empire and become an even graver threat. So Aetius persuaded Thorismund to return home quickly and secure the throne for himself, before his brothers could. Otherwise, civil war would ensue among the Visigoths. Thorismund quickly returned to Tolosa (present-day Toulouse) and became king without any resistance. Gregory of Tours claims Aetius used the same reasoning to dismiss his Frankish allies, and collected the booty of the battlefield for himself.[77] Outcome The primary sources give little information as to the outcome of the battle, barring Jordanes. All emphasize the casualty count of the battle, and the battle became increasingly seen as a Gothic victory, beginning with Cassiodorus in the early sixth century.[78] Hydatius states: The Huns broke the peace and plundered the Gallic provinces. A great many cities were taken. On the Catalaunian Plains, not far from the city of Metz, which they had taken, the Huns were cut down in battle with the aid of God and defeated by general Aetius and King Theoderic, who had made a peace treaty with each other. The darkness of night interrupted the fighting. King Theoderic was laid low there and died. Almost 300,000 men are said to have fallen in that battle. — Hydatius, Chronicon, 150.[79] Prosper, contemporary to the battle, states: After killing his brother, Attila was strengthened by the resources of the deceased and forced many thousands of neighboring peoples into a war. This war, he announced as a guardian of Roman friendship, he would wage only against the Goths. But when he had crossed the Rhine and many Gallic cities had experienced his savage attacks, both our people and the Goths soon agreed to oppose with allied forces the fury of their proud enemies. And Aetius had such great foresight that, when fighting men were hurriedly collected from everywhere, a not unequal force met the opposing multitude. Although the slaughter of all those who died there was incalculable – for neither side gave way – it appears that the Huns were defeated in this battle because those among them that survived lost their taste for fighting and turned back home. —Prosper, Epitoma Chronicon, s.a. 451.[80] The battle raged five miles down from Troyes on the field called Maurica in Campania. —Additamenta ad Chronicon Prosperi Hauniensis, s.a. 451.[81] At this time Attila, king of the Huns, invaded the Gauls. Here trusting in lord Peter the apostle himself patrician Aetius proceeded against him, he would fight with the help of God. —Continuatio Codex Ovetensis.[82] Battle was made in the Gauls between Aetius and Attila king of the Huns with both peoples and massacre. Attila fled into the greater Gauls. —Continuatio Codex Reichenaviensis.[83] The Gallic Chronicles of 452 and 511 state: Attila entered Gaul as if he had the right to ask for a wife that was owed to him. There, he inflicted and suffered defeat and then withdrew to his homeland. —Chronica Gallica Anno 452, s.a. 451.[84] Patrician Aetius with King Theodoric of the Goths fight against Attila king of the Huns at Tricasses on the Mauriac plain, where Theodoric was slain, by whom it is uncertain, and Laudaricus the relative of Attila: and the bodies were countless. —Chronica Gallica Anno 511, s.a. 451.[85] The Paschale Chronicle, preserving a garbled and abbreviated passage of Priscus, states: While Theodosius and Valentinian, the Augusti, were emperors, Attila, from the race of the Gepid Huns, marched against Rome and Constantinople with a multitude of many tens of thousands. He notified Valentinian, the emperor of Rome, through a Gothic ambassador, "Attila, my master and yours, orders you through me to make ready the palace for him." He gave the same notice to Theodosius, the emperor in Constantinople, through a Gothic ambassador. Aetius, the first man of senatorial rank in Rome, heard the excessive daring of Attila's desperate response and went off to Alaric in Gaul, who was an enemy of Rome because of Honorius. He urged him to join him in standing against Attila, since he had destroyed many Roman cities. They unexpectedly launched himself against him as he was bivouacked near the Danubios river, and cut down his many thousands. Alaric, wounded by a saggita in the engagement, died. Attila died similarly, carried off by a nasal hemorrhage while he slept at night with his Hunnic concubine. It was suspected that this girl killed him. The very wise Priscus the Thracian wrote about this war. —Chronicon Paschale, p. 587.[49] Jordanes reports the number of dead from this battle as 165,000, excluding the casualties of the Franco-Gepid skirmish previous to the main battle. Hydatius, a historian who lived at the time of Attila's invasion, reports the number of 300,000 dead.[86] The garbled Chronicle of Fredegar states that in a prior battle on the Loire, 200,000 Goths and 150,000 Huns were slain.[87] The figures offered are implausibly high, but the battle was noted as being exceptionally bloody by all of the primary sources. It is ultimately Jordanes' writing that leads to the difference in opinions in modern interpretations of the battle's outcome. As a Roman victory In the traditional account, modern scholars take a very direct interpretation of Jordanes, although usually with various points of contention. Modern scholars tend to agree that the battle took place on a long ridge, not a plain with a hill to one side.[88][56][89] Hughes argues that the Huns deployed in the center, with their vassals on the wings, because they were expecting a Roman infantry center, with cavalry wings. This way Attila could pin down the center with the disorganized Hunnic style of warfare, while the majority of his troops focused on breaking one or both of the enemy flanks. However, Hughes argues that the Romans were expecting this, which is why he placed the Alans in the center of the formation, who were skilled cavalrymen and had advanced knowledge of how to fight alongside the Roman style of warfare.[90] Bachrach also notes that Jordanes' point of placing the Alans in the center due to disloyalty is biased on Jordanes' part.[91] Jordanes' description of the battle, according to Hughes, takes place from the Roman perspective. Attila's forces arrived on the ridge first, on the far right side, before the Visigoths could take that position. Then Aetius' Romans arrived on the left side of the ridge, and repulsed the Gepids as they came up. Finally the Alans and the Visigoths under Thorismund fought their way up and secured the center of the ridge, holding it against Attila.[92] However, Hughes differs from mainstream explanations in that he places Thorismund between the Alans and Visigothic main body, rather than on the Visigothic flank. MacDowall, for example, places Thorismund on the far right of the battlefield.[93] The final phase of the battle is characterized by the Gothic attempt to take the right side of the ridge, in which Theodoric is slain, with the rest of his army unaware of his death. It is at this point that Thorismund located Attila's position in the Hunnic battle line, and attacked the Hunnic center, nearly slaying Attila himself and forcing the Hunnic center to retreat. Both armies fell into confusion as darkness descended, and neither side knew the outcome of the battle until the following morning.[94] After the battle, the allies decided what to do next, and resolved to place Attila under siege for a few days while they discussed the matter. Aetius allegedly persuaded both Thorismund and the Goths, and the Franks as well, to leave the battle and return home. Hughes argues that since the Franks were fighting a civil war in the battle, and Thorismund had five brothers who could usurp his new-found position as king, that it is likely Aetius did advise them to do so.[95] O'Flynn argues that Aetius persuaded the Visigoths to return home in order to eliminate a group of volatile allies, and argues that he let Attila escape because he would have been just as happy to make an alliance with the Huns as with the Visigoths.[96] The majority of historians also share the view that at this point Attila's "aura of invincibility" was broken, and that Aetius allowed the Huns to retreat in the hopes he could return to a status of partnership with them and draw on the Huns for future military support.[97][98][99] As a Roman defeat or indecisive It has been suggested by Hyun Jin Kim that the entire battle is a play on the Battle of Marathon, with the Romans being the Plateans on the left, the Alans the weak Athenian center, and the Goths the Athenian regulars on the right, with Theodoric as Miltiades and Thorismund as Callimachus. He sees the return home by the Goths to secure Thorismund's throne as the same as the return to Athens to protect it from sedition and the Persian Navy.[100][101] Kim's suggestion of Jordanes borrowing Herodotus has been noted by prior scholarship: Franz Altheim drew a parallel between the Catalaunian Fields and Salamis, and thought that the battle narrative was completely fabricated.[102] John Wallace-Hadrill drew a parallel between Aetius and Themistocles regarding the alleged subterfuge after the battle in some primary source accounts.[101] Other historians have noted its possible political statements on Jordanes' contemporary time, particularly regarding the Battle of Vouille and the Gothic Wars towards the end of Justinian's reign.[12][103] Ultimately this has led mainstream scholarship to agree that Jordanes' description of the Battle of the Catalaunian fields is distorted, even if they do not agree with a pro-Hunnish interpretation of the outcome. However, Kim's views have received a mixed reception among scholars of the period, with one reviewer noting that much of the text amounts to "a confused and confusing story, involving the rewriting of histories, genealogies and chronologies... exacerbated by strange and clumsy conflations." His view that Attila won the battle therefore should be taken with skepticism.[104] Other authors have previously considered the battle to have been indecisive. This latter view is rather widely accepted, although the outcome remains in disagreement as a whole.[105][106] The most recent and comprehensive argument for an indecisive outcome belongs to that of Schultheis, who argues that Jordanes' work is more complicated than assumed due to the rearranging of a narrative first penned by a Goth named Ablabius in 471 and expanded by Cassiodorus, which he then himself abridged again and which in turn was used by Jordanes.[107] Schultheis argues that provided that the entire conflict was not a literary topos based on the Battle of Marathon, the Alans were placed in the center of the battle line due to their effectiveness against the Huns as proscribed by the Strategikon of Pseudo-Maurice, and that Jordanes' text indicates the Hunnic center retreated before Thorismund charged. The Romans and Alans attacked down the ridge and across the plain to Attila's camp, while the Amali and other Gothic groups chased the collapsing Gothic right back to their camp, resulting in the mass confusion that followed. He concludes that losses during the retreats were heavy and led to an indecisive outcome, which an analysis of the chronology of primary source accounts shows over time was embellished into a Gothic victory.[108]

 조동봉 용산공업고등학교건축과

反宇宙體반우주체식인체食人體식육체食肉體마물체魔物體짐승체獸禽畜體부정정사否定情事부정사음부정정교부정섹스부정결혼부정혼인부정통혼플레이아데스4대무법자630128-1067814朴鐘權的大億劫的削的磨的滅的處理的반사회성인격장애否定腐敗부정부패荷蘭네덜란드尼德蘭아틀란티스Atlantis준아틀란티스준성단준성운지구말데크Maldek리라Lyra베가VegaαLyrae안드로메다아플레이아데스α LyraeAlpha LyraeAlpha Lyr or α Lyr

리라Lyra플레이아데스4대무법자

아플레이아데스1대수장首長

아플레이아데스2대수장首長

이건희(李健熙, 1942년 1월 9일~2020년 10월 25일)

이재용(李在鎔, 1968년 6월 23일~)

이병철(李秉喆, 1910년 2월 12일 ~ 1987년 11월 19일)

메이지 천황(일본어: 明治天皇 메이지 텐노[*], 1852년 11월 3일 ~ 1912년 7월 30일)

쇼와 천황(일본어: 昭和天皇, 1901년 4월 29일 ~ 1989년 1월 7일)

조지 워커 부시(영어: George Walker Bush 듣기 (도움말·정보), 문화어: 죠지 워커 부쉬, 1946년 7월 6일~)

엘리자베스 2세(영어: Elizabeth II, 1926년 4월 21일~2022년 9월 8일)

엘리자베스 1세(영어: Elizabeth I, 1533년 9월 7일 ~ 1603년 3월 24일)

마거릿 힐더 대처(영어: Margaret Hilda Thatcher, Baroness Thatcher, LG, OM, 1925년 10월 13일 ~ 2013년 4월 8일)

연 태조 문명황제 모용황(燕 太祖 文明皇帝 慕容皝, 297년 ~ 348년, 재위: 337년 ~ 348년)

아틸라(라틴어: Attila, 고대 노르드어: Atli 아틀리→끔찍한 자, 독일어: Etzel 에첼[*], 406년 ~ 453년)

리라Lyra플레이아데스4대무법자미마쓰

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박정희(朴正熙,[4] 1917년 11월 14일~1979년 10월 26일)

이승만(李承晚[3], 1875년 3월 26일 ~ 1965년 7월 19일)

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전두환(한국 한자: 全斗煥, 1931년 1월 18일~2021년 11월 23일)

노태우(盧泰愚, 1932년 12월 4일~2021년 10월 26일[2][3])

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이명박(李明博[1], 1941년 12월 19일~)

박근혜(朴槿惠[2], 1952년 2월 2일~)

문재인(文在寅, 1953년 1월 24일~)

윤석열(尹錫悅, 표준 발음: 윤서결[주해 1], 1960년 12월 18일~)

카탈라우눔 전투 또는 샬롱 전투는 451년 플라비우스 아이티우스와 서고트족 왕 테오도리쿠스 1세가 이끄는 서로마 제국과 포이데라티의 연합군과 아틸라가 이끄는 훈족과 그 동맹군 사이의 전투이다.이 전투는 서로마 제국 최후의 주요 군사작전이 되었으며 이 전투에서 서고트족 국왕 테오도리쿠스 1세가 전사하고 어느 쪽도 결정적인 승리를 거두지는 못했으나, 훈족의 서진을 저지하는 데 성공하였다.

역사의 기록은 분명히 과장되었고 따라서 믿을 수 없기 때문에, 양 측의 병력 규모는 추측으로만 알 수 있다. 6세기의 로마 역사가 요르다네스(Jordanes)는 당시 전장에 50만 명의 병사가 있다고도 했다. 군 역사가들의 견해에 따르면, 당시의 병참 기술을 고려했을 때 아무리 많더라도 양 쪽에 약 5만에서 6만 정도의 군인들이 있었을 거라고 한다. 하지만 아마 더욱 더 적었을 것이다. 로마 군대의 경우에는 그 수를 더 잘 추정할 수 있다. 요르다네스에 따르면 그 군대의 절반가량은 포이데라티(foederati, 로마 제국 내의 영주권을 인정받는 대가로 병력 제공의 의무를 진 이민족들)라고 불린 서고트족들인데, 그들은 전성기에도 전장에 2만 명 이상 나갈 수 없었기 때문이다. 그러므로 알라니(Alani)족을 고려한다고 해도 서로마 황제 휘하 군대는 결코 45000명을 훨씬 넘지 않았을 것이다. 아틸라의 군대는 크지는 않은 수적 우세를 가졌다. 그러므로 약 최대 5만 명의 병력이 있었을 것이다. 다른 추측에 따르면 양 편의 군대는 약 3만 명 정도라고 한다. 이것이 5세기와 6세기 시절 고대 후기 군대의 보통 규모와 일치할 것이기 때문이다.

아틸라의 군대는 절반 정도만 훈족으로 구성되어 있었고 나머지 절반은 속국 병사들로 채워졌다. 이 병력들을 크기 순서대로 나열하면, 발라미르가 이끄는 동고트족, 아르다리쿠스가 이끄는 게피다이(Gepidae)족과, 라인강 우변에 사는 프랑크족 및 마인 강가에 사는 부족의 일족인 부르고뉴(부르군트)족이 특히 중요하다.

또한 헤룰리(Heruli)족, 스키리(Scirii)족, 랑고바르디(Langobardi)족 등이 소규모 병력으로 수백 명부터 2천 명까지 있었다. 동고트족이 속국 병력의 약 절반을 차지했던 것은 확인되었다. 훈족 병사들은 평소대로 말을 탄 채 창, 곤봉, 고리형 끈과 가장 중요한 무기인 특수 제작된 기병용 활로 무장했다. 그들은 보통은 어떤 갑옷도 착용하지 않았고 단지 작은 원형 가죽방패만 방어용으로 사용하였다. 게르만족 쪽의 속국 병력의 경우에는 달랐다. 동고트족의 병력 중 1/3은 기병이었는데, 다른 족들은 모두가 보병이었다. 동고트족 기병은 중무장 기병으로 분류될 수 있다. 당시에 그들은 찌르기용 창과 날이 넓은 검(독어 Breitschwert / 영어 broadsword)을 사용했으며, 최소한 가죽 갑옷을 착용하였지만 때로 쇠사슬 갑옷을 착용하기도 했으며, 방패를 구비하기도 하였기 때문이다. 그러나 이 시기의 고대 후기에는 아직 등자(말을 탈 때 발을 받쳐주는 도구)가 없었다. 보병들은 프랑크족을 제외하면 추측컨대 대개 갑옷없이 창, 날이 넓은 검 또는 장검을 가지고, 일부는 가벼운 방패도 가지고 출전했을 것이다. 게르만족은 원거리 무기를 거의 사용하지 않았으나, 동고트족만은 궁수 부대가 있었다. 프랑크족은 ‘프란치스카(Franzisca)’라는 일회용 원거리 무기, 즉 휘어진 모양의 투척용 도끼를 병사들의 충돌 직전에 사용했다. 그와 상관없이 프랑크족 병사들은 날이 넓은 검과 나무방패로 무장했다.

아에티우스의 군대는 절반가량이 로마 정규군 부대 및 프랑크족과 부르고뉴족의 포이데라티로 이루어졌고, 나머지 절반은 서고트족의 병사들로 이루어졌다. 여기에 수천 명의 알라니족이 함께했다.

로마군, 프랑크군, 부르고뉴군은 중무장 보병대를 형성했다. 그 때에는 로마 후기의 병사들은 더 이상 로마 제정 초기 시절의 군단(legio)이 아니었다. 그들은 타원형 방패, 조임쇠가 달린 투구, 양날의 긴 검(spatha), 당시 로마군에게 항상 상당한 전투력을 안겨준 동양식 복합형 활을 가지고 다녔으며, 팔다리를 더 이상 가리지 않는 쇠사슬갑옷을 입었다. 그 부대의 일부는 아직 ‘군단’이라 불렸으나 1천 명에서 2천 명 사이의 병력만을 통솔했다. 아에티우스가 소집했던 많은 군인들은 리미타네이(limitanei, 국경지역 병사들)로 여겨지는데, 이들은 대체로 주둔지 근처의 특정 지역에 거주하는 주민들로 구성되었다. 이것은 기동성을 줄이지만 바로 그들 자신의 공동체와 가족을 지키려는 까닭에, 이 부대의 사기는 그만큼 높다. 황제 근위대인 코미타텐세스(comitatenses)는 5세기 중엽 서로마에서 더 이상 큰 역할을 하지 못했는데, 이 정예군 아래 끝없는 안팎의 분쟁이 높은 손실을 끼쳤고, 텅 빈 국고 때문에 이 부대를 예전과 같이 만들 수 없었기 때문이다. 아에티우스는 코미타텐세스도 포함하여 아직 지휘권이 있는 로마 군대 모두를 아틸라에게 대항하도록 했던 것으로 보인다. 많은 이들이 기병이었다.

라인강 변에 사는 리푸아리아 프랑크족은 아마 위에 언급된 라인강 오른쪽에 사는 프랑크족과 똑같이 무장하였을 것이다. 양 측 군대에 다 있는 부르고뉴족은 단지 장검만으로 싸웠음이 명백하다. 서고트족 병사들은 378년의 아드리아노폴리스 전투 이래로, 알라니족 기병대의 명백한 본보기를 통해 보병에서 점점 더 많이 기병으로 넘어가고 있었다. 그래서 적어도 서고트 징집병의 2/3는 기병이었다. 그들은 쇠사슬갑옷과 찌르기용 창으로 무장한 귀족 기병대와, 일반 민중 출신의 경무장 기병대로 나뉜다. 후자의 기병대는 대개 갑옷이 없었으나, 투창, 날이 넓은 검, 그리고 아마도 나무나 여러 겹의 가죽으로 된 작은 기병용 방패는 있었다. 보병들에게는 창, 날이 넓은 검, 방패가 아주 널리 퍼졌으며 극히 드물지만 단순형 활도 있었고, 갑옷은 없었다. 알라니족의 무장과 싸우는 방식은 결과적으로 훈족을 아주 많이 닮았다.The Battle of the Catalaunian Plains (or Fields), also called the Battle of the Campus Mauriacus, Battle of Châlons, Battle of Troyes[5] or the Battle of Maurica, took place on June 20, 451 AD, between a coalition, led by the Roman general Flavius Aetius and the Visigothic king Theodoric I, against the Huns and their vassals, commanded by their king, Attila. It proved one of the last major military operations of the Western Roman Empire, although Germanic foederati composed the majority of the coalition army. Whether the battle was of strategic significance is disputed; historians generally agree that the siege of Aurelianum was the decisive moment in the campaign[citation needed] and stopped the Huns' attempt to advance any further into Roman territory or establish vassals in Roman Gaul. However, the Huns successfully looted and pillaged much of Gaul and crippled the military capacity of the Romans and Visigoths. Attila died only two years later, in 453; after the Battle of Nedao in 454 AD, the coalition of the Huns and the incorporated Germanic vassals gradually disintegrated.

By 450 AD, the Romans had restored their authority in much of the province of Gaul, although control over all of the provinces beyond Italy was continuing to diminish. Armorica was only nominally part of the empire, and Germanic tribes occupying Roman territory had been forcibly settled and bound by treaty as Foederati under their own leaders. Northern Gaul between the Rhine north of Xanten and the Lys (Germania Inferior) had unofficially been abandoned to the Salian Franks. The Visigoths on the Garonne were growing restive, but still holding to their treaty. The Burgundians in Sapaudia were more submissive, but likewise awaiting an opening for revolt.[6] The Alans on the Loire and in Valentinois were more loyal, having served the Romans since the defeat of Jovinus in 411 and the Siege of Bazas in 414.[7] The parts of Gaul still securely in Roman control were the Mediterranean coastline; a region including Aurelianum (present-day Orléans) along the Seine and the Loire as far north as Soissons and Arras; the middle and upper Rhine to Cologne; and downstream along the Rhône.[8]

The historian Jordanes states that Attila was enticed by the Vandal king Genseric to wage war on the Visigoths. At the same time, Genseric would attempt to sow strife between the Visigoths and the Western Roman Empire.[9][Note 1] However, Jordanes' account of Gothic history is notoriously unreliable.[10][Note 2] Modern scholars now believe that this explanation was Jordanes projecting contemporary events and political opinions onto Attila's time, and it was likely not original to Priscus. Christiensen points out that Amalafrida, wife of Thrasamund, was imprisoned and murdered by Hilderic after Thrasamund's death in 523, and that the tale of the blinding of Theodoric's daughter by Huneric was a fabrication.[14]

Other contemporary writers offer different motivations: Justa Grata Honoria, the sister of the emperor Valentinian III, had been betrothed to the former consul Bassus Herculanus the year before. In 450, she sent the eunuch Hyacinthus to the Hunnic king asking for Attila's help in escaping her confinement, with her ring as proof of the letter's legitimacy.[15] Allegedly, Attila interpreted it as offering her hand in marriage, and he had claimed half of the empire as a dowry. He demanded Honoria to be delivered along with the dowry. Valentinian rejected these demands, and Attila used it as an excuse to launch a destructive campaign through Gaul.[Note 3] Hughes suggests that the reality of this interpretation should be that Honoria was using Attila's status as honorary magister militum for political leverage.[16]

Another conflict leading into the war was that in 449, the King of the Franks (possibly Chlodio) had died and that his two sons argued over the succession: while the older son sought Attila's help, the younger sided with Aetius, who adopted him. The identity of the younger prince, who was seen at Rome by the historian Priscus,[17] remains unclear, though both Merowech and Childeric I have been suggested.

Attila crossed the Rhine early in 451 with his followers and a large number of allies, sacking Divodurum (now Metz) on April 7.[18] Schultheis notes, however, that sacking of Metz on April 7 may have been a literary trope used by Hydatius and Gregory of Tours to emphasize Attila's pagan nature to a Christian audience and may not be reliable.[19] Other cities attacked can be determined by the hagiographies written to commemorate their bishops: Nicasius was slaughtered before the altar of his church in Reims; Servatius is alleged to have saved Tongeren with his prayers, as Genevieve is to have saved Lutetia. Lupus, bishop of Troyes, is also credited with saving his city by meeting Attila in person.[Note 4] Many other cities also claim to have been attacked in these accounts, although archaeological evidence shows no destruction layer dating to the timeframe of the invasion. The most likely explanation for Attila's widespread devastation of Gaul is that Attila's main column followed the Roman roads and crossed the Rhine at Argentoratum (Strasbourg) before marching to Borbetomagus (Worms), Mogontiacum (Mainz), Augusta Treverorum (Trier), Divodurum (Metz), Durocotorum (Reims), and finally Aurelianum (Orléans), while sending a small detachment north into Frankish territory to plunder the countryside. This explanation would support the literary evidence claiming North Gaul was attacked, and the archaeological evidence showing major population centers were not sacked.[19][20]

Attila's army had reached Aurelianum (modern Orléans, France) before June. According to Jordanes, the Alan king Sangiban, whose Foederati realm included Aurelianum, had promised to open the city gates.[21] This siege is confirmed by the account of the Vita S. Aniani and in the later account of Gregory of Tours, although Sangiban's name does not appear in their accounts.[22][23] However, the inhabitants of Aurelianum shut their gates against the advancing invaders, and Attila began to besiege the city, while he waited for Sangiban to deliver on his promise. There are two different accounts of the Siege of Aurelianum, and Hughes suggests that combining them provides a better understanding of what actually happened.[24] After four days of heavy rain, Attila began his final assault on June 14, which was broken off due to the approach of the Roman coalition.[22] Modern scholars tend to agree that the Siege of Aurelianum was the high point of Attila's attack on the West, and the staunch Alan defence of the city was the real decisive factor in the war of 451.[24] Contrary to Jordanes, the Alans were never planning to defect as they were the loyal backbone of the Roman defence in Gaul.[25][26]

Forces

Both armies consisted of combatants from many peoples. Besides the Roman troops, the Alans, and the Visigoths, Jordanes lists Aetius' allies as including the Francii, Sarmatae, Armoriciani, Liticiani, Burgundiones, Saxones, Riparii, and Olibrones (whom he describes as "once Roman soldiers and now the flower of the allied forces"), as well as "other Celtic or German tribes."[27] The Liticiani could be either Laeti or Romano-Britons, the latter of which are recorded by Gregory.[28][29][30] Halsall argues that the Rhine limitanei and the old British field army composed the forces of the Riparii and Armoricans, and Heather suggests that the Visigoths may have been able to field about 25,000 men total.[31] Drinkwater adds that a faction of Alemanni may have participated in the battle, possibly on both sides like the Franks and Burgundians.[32] The Olibrones remain unknown, although it has been suggested these were Germanic limitanei garrisons.[33] Schultheis argues that on paper, the Germanic federates could theoretically number more than 70,000, but likely numbered under 50,000.[34]

A sense of the size of the actual Roman army may be found in the study of the Notitia Dignitatum by A.H.M. Jones.[35] This document is a list of officials and military units that was last updated in the first decades of the fifth century. The Notitia Dignitatum lists 58 various regular units, and 33 limitanei serving either in the Gallic provinces or on the frontiers nearby; the total of these units, based on Jones' analysis, is 34,000 for the regular units and 11,500 for the limitanei, or just under 46,000 all told. However, this figure is an estimate for the years 395–425 and one that constantly changes with new research. The loss of the Western Roman provinces in North Africa resulted in the loss of funding for 40,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry in the Roman army, in addition to previous losses, which was enough to permanently cripple Roman military capacity after 439 AD.[36] According to Herwig Wolfram, with an annual revenue of 40,000 pounds of gold in 450 AD, the Western Empire would have had to spend almost two thirds of its income to maintain an army of 30,000 men.[37] Hugh Elton gives the same figure in 450, but estimates the cost of maintaining an army of 300,000 at 31,625 lbs. of gold or 7.6 solidi a year per soldier. He states that there were also other unquantifiable military costs such as defensive installations, equipment, logistical supplies, paper, animals, and other costs. The size of the army in 450 AD therefore must have been significantly reduced from its status in the late 420's.[38] Schultheis argues that the Roman field army as calculated from his own estimates of the Notitia Dignitatum, chronology of military losses, and income losses numbered approximately 20,500 comitatenses and 18,000 limitanei by the time of the battle, not including supernumerary officers.[39]

Jordanes' list for Attila's allies includes the Gepids under their king Ardaric, as well as an army of various Gothic groups led by the brothers Valamir, Theodemir (the father of the later Ostrogothic king Theodoric the Great) and Videmir, scions of the Amali Goths.[40] Sidonius Apollinaris offers a more extensive list of allies: Rugians, Gepids, Geloni, Burgundians, Sciri, Bellonoti, Neuri, Bastarnae, Thuringians, Bructeri, and Franks living along the River Neckar.[41] E.A. Thompson expresses his suspicions that some of these names are drawn from literary traditions rather than from the event itself:

The Bastarnae, Bructeri, Geloni and Neuri had disappeared hundreds of years before the time of the Huns, while the Bellonoti had never existed at all: presumably the learned poet was thinking of the Balloniti, a people invented by Valerius Flaccus nearly four centuries earlier.

On the other hand, Thompson believes that the presence of Burgundians on the Hunnic side is credible, noting that a group is documented remaining east of the Rhine; likewise, he believes that the other peoples Sidonius mentions (the Rugians, Sciri, and Thuringians) were participants in this battle.[42]

Thompson remarks in a footnote, "I doubt that Attila could have fed an army of even 30,000 men."[43] Lindner argues that by crossing the Carpathians to the area of modern Hungary the Huns had forfeited their best logistic base and grazing grounds, and that the Great Hungarian Plain could only support 15,000 mounted nomads.[44] Schultheis notes that Attila had control of other Hunnic groups east of the Carpathians, and proposes the eastern half of Attila's empire could field an additional 7,000 to 12,000 men based on later 6th century sources.[45] Kim notes that the Huns continued use of the Xiongnu decimal system, meaning their army was probably organized into divisions of 10, 100, 1000, and 10,000, but no real estimates of Hunnic military capacity can be determined.[46] Their barbarian allies, however, do receive mentions at other times in other sources: in 430 CE. The Hunnish king Octar was defeated by a force of 3,000 Neckar Burgundians who would later come under Hun subjugation, and Heather estimates that both the Gepids and the Amali Goths could have each fielded a maximum of 15,000 men at the Battle of Nedao in 454.[47][48] Schultheis argues that when combining primary and secondary source estimates Attila's forces would number more than 100,000 on paper, but was likely closer to 70,000.[45] The Chronicon Paschale, which preserves an extremely abbreviated and garbled fragment of Priscus' account of the campaign, states that Attila's forces numbered in the tens of thousands.[49][50] Assuming that the Hunnic and Germanic forces were roughly the same size as the Roman and federate army, those involved in the battle could have been well in excess of 100,000 combatants in total. This excludes the inevitable servants and camp followers who usually escape mention in the primary sources.

Site of the Catalaunian Fields

Further information: Treasure of Pouan

The actual location of the Catalaunian Fields has long been considered unclear. As a whole, the current scholarly consensus is that there is no conclusive site, merely being that it is in the vicinity of Châlons-en-Champagne (formerly called Châlons-sur-Marne) or Troyes. Historian Thomas Hodgkin located the site near Méry-sur-Seine.[51] A more recent evaluation of the location has been performed by Phillippe Richardot, who proposed a location of La Cheppe, slightly north of the modern town of Châlons.[52]

In 1842, at Pouan-les-Vallées, a village on the south bank of the river Aube, a labourer uncovered a burial containing a skeleton, a number of jewels and gold ornaments, and two swords.[53] By the nature of its grave goods, it was initially thought to be the burial of Theodoric, but Hodgkin expressed skepticism, suggesting that this elite burial was that of a princely Germanic warrior who had lived in the fifth century.[54][55] The Treasure of Pouan is conserved in the Musée des beaux-arts de Troyes, Troyes. It is still not known whether or not the find is related to the battle.

Simon Macdowall in his 2015 Osprey title proposed the battle took place at Montgueux just west of Troyes.[56] Macdowall goes as far as to identify the Roman alliance's camp site being placed at Fontvannes, a few kilometers west of the proposed battlefield, and places Attila's camp on the Seine at Saint-Lyé.[57] This draws on the earlier work of M. Girard, who was able to identify Maurica as the "les Maures" ridge of Montgueux, based on the second Additamenta Altera to Prosper's Epitoma Chronicon, which states it took place five Roman miles from Tecis or Tricasses, the modern Troyes. The road in the region is known as the "Voie des Maures", and the base of the ridge is known as "l'enfer" to the locals. A small stream near the battlefield that runs to Troyes is known as "la Riviere de Corps" to this day.[58] According to MacDowall, modern maps continue to identify the plains in the region as the "les Maurattes." Iaroslav Lebedensky argued the battle likely stretched across the plain from Montgueux south to Tourvellieres, while Schultheis argues that the battle took place wholly on the "les Maures" ridge itself until its final phase, when retreating and pursuing forces stretched across several kilometers.[59][60] The ridge at Montgueux is currently the most thoroughly researched proposal for the battlefield location.

Battle

Course of the battle

The Battle of the Catalaunian Plains as depicted in the Chronica Hungarorum

Upon learning of the invasion, the magister utriusque militiae Flavius Aetius moved his army rapidly from Italy to Gaul. According to Sidonius Apollinaris, he was leading a force consisting of "few and sparse auxiliaries without one regular soldier."[61] The insignificant number of Roman troops reported is probably due to the fact the majority of Aetius' army was stationed in Gaul, combined with Sidonius' need to embellish the account in favor of Avitus.[62] Aetius immediately attempted to persuade Theodoric I, king of the Visigoths, to join him. Allegedly, Theodoric learned how few troops Aetius had with him and decided it was wiser to wait and oppose the Huns in his own lands, so Aetius then turned to the former Praetorian Prefect of Gaul, Avitus, for help. According to tradition, Avitus was not only able to persuade Theodoric to join the Romans, but also a number of other wavering barbarian residents in Gaul.[63] The coalition assembled at Arelate (Arles) before moving to meet the Goths at Tolosa (Toulouse), and the army was supplied by Tonantius Ferreolus, who had been preparing for a Hunnic attack for a few years.[64] The combined army then marched to Aurelianum (present-day Orléans), reaching that city on June 14.

From Aurelianum, Aetius and his coalition pursued Attila, who was leaving Gaul with the majority of his objectives completed.[65] According to Jordanes, the night before the main battle, some of the Franks allied with the Romans encountered a band of the Gepids loyal to Attila and engaged them in a skirmish. Jordanes' recorded number of 15,000 dead on either side for this skirmish is not verifiable.[66] Attila had set up a tactical delay along his route of retreat in order to keep Aetius from catching him before he arrived at a suitable battlefield location.[67] The two forces at last met somewhere on the Catalaunian Fields circa June 20, a date first proposed by J. B. Bury and since accepted by many, although some authors have proposed the first week of July or September 27.[68][51][69] The date of the battle can be secured to June by the entries of Hydatius' chronicle, which places it in-between the appearance and disappearance of Halley's Comet.

According to tradition, Attila had his diviners examine the entrails of a sacrifice the morning of the day of the battle. They foretold that disaster would befall the Huns, but one of the enemy leaders would be killed. Attila delayed until the ninth hour (about 2:30 pm) so the impending sunset would help his troops to flee the battlefield in case of defeat.[70][71] Hughes takes his own interpretation of this, noting that the divination may be an indicator of Attila's barbarity and therefore possibly a fabrication. He states that the choice to begin the battle at the ninth hour was due to the fact that both sides spent the entire day carefully deploying their coalition armies.[72]

According to Jordanes, the Catalaunian plain rose on one side by a sharp slope to a ridge; this geographical feature dominated the battlefield and became the center of the battle. The Huns first seized the right side of the ridge, while the Romans seized the left, with the crest unoccupied between them. Jordanes explains that the Visigoths held the right side, the Romans the left, with Sangiban of uncertain loyalty and his Alans surrounded in the middle. The Hunnic forces attempted to take the ridge, but were outstripped by the Romans under Aetius and the Goths under Thorismund.[73]

Jordanes goes on to state that Theodoric, whilst leading his own men against the enemy Amali Goths, was killed in the assault without his men noticing. He then states that Theodoric was either thrown from his horse and trampled to death by his advancing men, or slain by the spear of the Amali Andag. Since Jordanes served as the notary of Andag's son Gunthigis, even if this latter story is not true, this version was certainly a proud family tradition.[74][49]

Then Jordanes claims the Visigoths outstripped the speed of the Alans beside them and fell upon Attila's own Hunnic household unit. Attila was forced to seek refuge in his own camp, which he had fortified with wagons. The Romano-Gothic charge apparently swept past the Hunnic camp in pursuit; when night fell, Thorismund, son of king Theodoric, returning to friendly lines, mistakenly entered Attila's encampment. There he was wounded in the ensuing melee before his followers could rescue him. Darkness also separated Aetius from his own men. As he feared that disaster had befallen them, he spent the rest of the night with his Gothic allies.[75]

On the following day, finding the battlefield was "piled high with bodies and the Huns did not venture forth", the Goths and Romans met to decide their next move. Knowing that Attila was low on provisions and "was hindered from approaching by a shower of arrows placed within the confines of the Roman camp", they started to besiege his camp. In this desperate situation, Attila remained unbowed and "heaped up a funeral pyre of horse saddles, so that if the enemy should attack him, he was determined to cast himself into the flames, that none might have the joy of wounding him and that the lord of so many races might not fall into the hands of his foes".[76]

While Attila was besieged in his camp, the Visigoths searched for their missing king and his son Thorismund. After a long search, they found Theodoric's corpse "where the dead lay thickest" and bore him away with heroic songs in sight of the enemy. Upon learning of his father's death, Thorismund wanted to assault Attila's camp, but Aetius dissuaded him. According to Jordanes, Aetius feared that if the Huns were completely destroyed, the Visigoths would break off their allegiance to the Roman Empire and become an even graver threat. So Aetius persuaded Thorismund to return home quickly and secure the throne for himself, before his brothers could. Otherwise, civil war would ensue among the Visigoths. Thorismund quickly returned to Tolosa (present-day Toulouse) and became king without any resistance. Gregory of Tours claims Aetius used the same reasoning to dismiss his Frankish allies, and collected the booty of the battlefield for himself.[77]

Outcome

The primary sources give little information as to the outcome of the battle, barring Jordanes. All emphasize the casualty count of the battle, and the battle became increasingly seen as a Gothic victory, beginning with Cassiodorus in the early sixth century.[78]

Hydatius states:

The Huns broke the peace and plundered the Gallic provinces. A great many cities were taken. On the Catalaunian Plains, not far from the city of Metz, which they had taken, the Huns were cut down in battle with the aid of God and defeated by general Aetius and King Theoderic, who had made a peace treaty with each other. The darkness of night interrupted the fighting. King Theoderic was laid low there and died. Almost 300,000 men are said to have fallen in that battle. — Hydatius, Chronicon, 150.[79]

Prosper, contemporary to the battle, states:

After killing his brother, Attila was strengthened by the resources of the deceased and forced many thousands of neighboring peoples into a war. This war, he announced as a guardian of Roman friendship, he would wage only against the Goths. But when he had crossed the Rhine and many Gallic cities had experienced his savage attacks, both our people and the Goths soon agreed to oppose with allied forces the fury of their proud enemies. And Aetius had such great foresight that, when fighting men were hurriedly collected from everywhere, a not unequal force met the opposing multitude. Although the slaughter of all those who died there was incalculable – for neither side gave way – it appears that the Huns were defeated in this battle because those among them that survived lost their taste for fighting and turned back home. —Prosper, Epitoma Chronicon, s.a. 451.[80]

The battle raged five miles down from Troyes on the field called Maurica in Campania. —Additamenta ad Chronicon Prosperi Hauniensis, s.a. 451.[81]

At this time Attila, king of the Huns, invaded the Gauls. Here trusting in lord Peter the apostle himself patrician Aetius proceeded against him, he would fight with the help of God. —Continuatio Codex Ovetensis.[82]

Battle was made in the Gauls between Aetius and Attila king of the Huns with both peoples and massacre. Attila fled into the greater Gauls. —Continuatio Codex Reichenaviensis.[83]

The Gallic Chronicles of 452 and 511 state:

Attila entered Gaul as if he had the right to ask for a wife that was owed to him. There, he inflicted and suffered defeat and then withdrew to his homeland. —Chronica Gallica Anno 452, s.a. 451.[84]

Patrician Aetius with King Theodoric of the Goths fight against Attila king of the Huns at Tricasses on the Mauriac plain, where Theodoric was slain, by whom it is uncertain, and Laudaricus the relative of Attila: and the bodies were countless. —Chronica Gallica Anno 511, s.a. 451.[85]

The Paschale Chronicle, preserving a garbled and abbreviated passage of Priscus, states:

While Theodosius and Valentinian, the Augusti, were emperors, Attila, from the race of the Gepid Huns, marched against Rome and Constantinople with a multitude of many tens of thousands. He notified Valentinian, the emperor of Rome, through a Gothic ambassador, "Attila, my master and yours, orders you through me to make ready the palace for him." He gave the same notice to Theodosius, the emperor in Constantinople, through a Gothic ambassador. Aetius, the first man of senatorial rank in Rome, heard the excessive daring of Attila's desperate response and went off to Alaric in Gaul, who was an enemy of Rome because of Honorius. He urged him to join him in standing against Attila, since he had destroyed many Roman cities. They unexpectedly launched himself against him as he was bivouacked near the Danubios river, and cut down his many thousands. Alaric, wounded by a saggita in the engagement, died. Attila died similarly, carried off by a nasal hemorrhage while he slept at night with his Hunnic concubine. It was suspected that this girl killed him. The very wise Priscus the Thracian wrote about this war. —Chronicon Paschale, p. 587.[49]

Jordanes reports the number of dead from this battle as 165,000, excluding the casualties of the Franco-Gepid skirmish previous to the main battle. Hydatius, a historian who lived at the time of Attila's invasion, reports the number of 300,000 dead.[86] The garbled Chronicle of Fredegar states that in a prior battle on the Loire, 200,000 Goths and 150,000 Huns were slain.[87] The figures offered are implausibly high, but the battle was noted as being exceptionally bloody by all of the primary sources. It is ultimately Jordanes' writing that leads to the difference in opinions in modern interpretations of the battle's outcome.

As a Roman victory

In the traditional account, modern scholars take a very direct interpretation of Jordanes, although usually with various points of contention. Modern scholars tend to agree that the battle took place on a long ridge, not a plain with a hill to one side.[88][56][89] Hughes argues that the Huns deployed in the center, with their vassals on the wings, because they were expecting a Roman infantry center, with cavalry wings. This way Attila could pin down the center with the disorganized Hunnic style of warfare, while the majority of his troops focused on breaking one or both of the enemy flanks. However, Hughes argues that the Romans were expecting this, which is why he placed the Alans in the center of the formation, who were skilled cavalrymen and had advanced knowledge of how to fight alongside the Roman style of warfare.[90] Bachrach also notes that Jordanes' point of placing the Alans in the center due to disloyalty is biased on Jordanes' part.[91]

Jordanes' description of the battle, according to Hughes, takes place from the Roman perspective. Attila's forces arrived on the ridge first, on the far right side, before the Visigoths could take that position. Then Aetius' Romans arrived on the left side of the ridge, and repulsed the Gepids as they came up. Finally the Alans and the Visigoths under Thorismund fought their way up and secured the center of the ridge, holding it against Attila.[92] However, Hughes differs from mainstream explanations in that he places Thorismund between the Alans and Visigothic main body, rather than on the Visigothic flank. MacDowall, for example, places Thorismund on the far right of the battlefield.[93] The final phase of the battle is characterized by the Gothic attempt to take the right side of the ridge, in which Theodoric is slain, with the rest of his army unaware of his death. It is at this point that Thorismund located Attila's position in the Hunnic battle line, and attacked the Hunnic center, nearly slaying Attila himself and forcing the Hunnic center to retreat. Both armies fell into confusion as darkness descended, and neither side knew the outcome of the battle until the following morning.[94]

After the battle, the allies decided what to do next, and resolved to place Attila under siege for a few days while they discussed the matter. Aetius allegedly persuaded both Thorismund and the Goths, and the Franks as well, to leave the battle and return home. Hughes argues that since the Franks were fighting a civil war in the battle, and Thorismund had five brothers who could usurp his new-found position as king, that it is likely Aetius did advise them to do so.[95] O'Flynn argues that Aetius persuaded the Visigoths to return home in order to eliminate a group of volatile allies, and argues that he let Attila escape because he would have been just as happy to make an alliance with the Huns as with the Visigoths.[96] The majority of historians also share the view that at this point Attila's "aura of invincibility" was broken, and that Aetius allowed the Huns to retreat in the hopes he could return to a status of partnership with them and draw on the Huns for future military support.[97][98][99]

As a Roman defeat or indecisive

It has been suggested by Hyun Jin Kim that the entire battle is a play on the Battle of Marathon, with the Romans being the Plateans on the left, the Alans the weak Athenian center, and the Goths the Athenian regulars on the right, with Theodoric as Miltiades and Thorismund as Callimachus. He sees the return home by the Goths to secure Thorismund's throne as the same as the return to Athens to protect it from sedition and the Persian Navy.[100][101] Kim's suggestion of Jordanes borrowing Herodotus has been noted by prior scholarship: Franz Altheim drew a parallel between the Catalaunian Fields and Salamis, and thought that the battle narrative was completely fabricated.[102] John Wallace-Hadrill drew a parallel between Aetius and Themistocles regarding the alleged subterfuge after the battle in some primary source accounts.[101] Other historians have noted its possible political statements on Jordanes' contemporary time, particularly regarding the Battle of Vouille and the Gothic Wars towards the end of Justinian's reign.[12][103] Ultimately this has led mainstream scholarship to agree that Jordanes' description of the Battle of the Catalaunian fields is distorted, even if they do not agree with a pro-Hunnish interpretation of the outcome. However, Kim's views have received a mixed reception among scholars of the period, with one reviewer noting that much of the text amounts to "a confused and confusing story, involving the rewriting of histories, genealogies and chronologies... exacerbated by strange and clumsy conflations." His view that Attila won the battle therefore should be taken with skepticism.[104]

Other authors have previously considered the battle to have been indecisive. This latter view is rather widely accepted, although the outcome remains in disagreement as a whole.[105][106] The most recent and comprehensive argument for an indecisive outcome belongs to that of Schultheis, who argues that Jordanes' work is more complicated than assumed due to the rearranging of a narrative first penned by a Goth named Ablabius in 471 and expanded by Cassiodorus, which he then himself abridged again and which in turn was used by Jordanes.[107] Schultheis argues that provided that the entire conflict was not a literary topos based on the Battle of Marathon, the Alans were placed in the center of the battle line due to their effectiveness against the Huns as proscribed by the Strategikon of Pseudo-Maurice, and that Jordanes' text indicates the Hunnic center retreated before Thorismund charged. The Romans and Alans attacked down the ridge and across the plain to Attila's camp, while the Amali and other Gothic groups chased the collapsing Gothic right back to their camp, resulting in the mass confusion that followed. He concludes that losses during the retreats were heavy and led to an indecisive outcome, which an analysis of the chronology of primary source accounts shows over time was embellished into a Gothic victory.[108]